There is a key element of the situation in Afghanistan which directly bears on the chances of success for US policy but that is being treated in the public debate as, at best, a footnote: opium. For example, see this piece from the NYT op/ed page: 10 Steps to Victory in Afghanistan and note how little the issues comes up (answer: only twice).
Two of the main challenges facing the multi-national force in Afghanistan are 1) corruption within the Afghan state, and 2) removing the ability of the Taliban to be a functional force. A major issue that undercuts both of those goals is the fact that Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of the poppies used to produce opium. This fact by itself means that comparison to the Surge in Iraq, or discussions of the application of basic counter-insurgency strategies, are not as apt as many commentators (or, for that matter, politicians) are making them out to be. Profits from illicit opium cultivation create an intense incentive towards deep corruption, especially in the context of an ill-defined, under-developed state that does not control its own territory and that has a long-term history of warlordism. Indeed, every time I use the term state in this context I am tempted to use scare quotes.
Beyond the corruption problem, the Taliban can use illicit cultivation and trafficking to fund their operations indefinitely (see: the FARC).
While there have been discussion of bringing the Colombian model to Afghanistan (which, btw, is like saying the way the Detroit Lions are going to rebuild their franchise is by following the Washington Redskin’s model), on balance I have seen and read very little about about how the narcotics issue fits into the broader puzzle. Ignoring such an issue (or, at least, radically downplaying ) it is very disturbing, as it indicates that an unrealistic picture is being painted of the situation.
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October 4th, 2009 at 6:58 pm
Win or get out! That is what we need to do in Afghanistan. I know this is simplified but I cannot stand hearing the rest after nine years.
October 4th, 2009 at 7:07 pm
As a general sentiment I can’t disagree that if we stay, we ought to try and win. However, one of my problems with even that formulation is that I am not even sure if we know what “winning” means at this point.
October 4th, 2009 at 7:08 pm
To carry that thought a step further: I am not sure that there is a discernible “win” here to be had, and therefore I am leaning towards the “get out” position.
October 5th, 2009 at 9:08 pm
Yes, we can’t support a Narco-State, but they can support themselves. For Better or Worse we are propping up a Narco State, but like Columbia and Mexico that is manageable, what we can’t do is allow chaos unless we control the chaos.
I wish to suggest a New Strategy to get US Troops out of Afghanistan: Require the Afghan Government to start a Military Draft of all Afghan Men of Fighting Age. No Afghan should be on the sidelines watching US troops fight thier Taliban civil war. They must fight alongside US troops against the Taliban or be arrested as deserters. We train the Afghan Troops and along the way in boot camp teach them about the Rule of Law, Democracy, respect for minority religions and women and rules of engagement and other western ideas. The goal of this instant increase of the Afghan Military Size is that we convince the Afghan government that they must be more committed than we are to win. U.S. troops will then Only patrol with a ratio of at least 4 to 1 Afghans to US troops in support on the front lines. Having a Draft also weeds out those Afghans that are supporting the Taliban. Any desertion or corruption will require military battlefield justice and tribunals by Afghan Generals vetted by U.S. commanders. Any Afghan that is half hearted in this fight against the Taliban is either jailed or shot as enemies of the state or collaborating with the enemy.
October 11th, 2009 at 9:24 am
[...] I would point out that there is no mention of the complicating (to put it mildly) issue of the opium trade and how that makes fighting corruption and warlord-courting complicated, as well as providing an [...]
October 13th, 2009 at 8:30 am
[...] to fund its fight against the US and against Pakistan is going to continue unbated. Indeed, I think I read something about this just recently… addthis_url = ‘http%3A%2F%2Fwww.poliblogger.com%2F%3Fp%3D17088′; [...]
October 22nd, 2009 at 12:00 pm
[...] anything, the report underscore a point that I have continually tried to make: any serious discussion of what to do next in Afghanistan has to take into account the drug [...]