Madison’s Definition of a Republic. If we need a specific definition of republicanism in the US context, we need go no further than James Madison himself in Federalist #39 where he wrote:
we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified
We see here several key statements.
First, we find the concept of popular sovereignty as described in part I of this essay, i.e., that the government “derives all its powers….from the great body of the people” and “not from an inconsiderable proportion.” 1
Second, we note that in a republican government is administered by persons selected by the broader population for set times in office, or under conditions of good behavior. In short, via democratic elections or some sort of controlled appoints. As Madison notes elsewhere in Fed 39, there were plenty of places in the world that claimed to be “republics” but which were actually various types of autocracies. This gets back to the “rose by any other name” issue also noted in the previous portion of this essay.
At the end of the day, this all sounds very much like nascent democracy, and certainly isn’t a distinct form of government from democracy. Indeed, what Madison is describing in Fed 39 is representative democracy: the governing authority derives from the people, and the people elect the persons who will govern over them for a set period of time before new selections can be made.
Arguments about the democratic quality of the Senate, President and Supreme Court can legitimately be made (both in terms of their original and current forms), however there is no distinct republican regime type here that would distinguish it from democracy.
Republicanism and Federalism. For reasons that I find baffling, some folks confuse the notion of federalism (i.e., the sharing of policymaking and implementation between a central government and local governments that oversee specific territorial subunits, sometime called states, but also called any number of other things, including cantons and lander) and the concept of republicanism in the US context. I am not sure where this confusion comes into play, but it strikes me as worthy of clarification, and like with the definition of a republic, it is possible to consult Madison on this issues as well, but this time via Federalist #51.
In the latter half of Fed 51, Madison describes two kinds of republics: the single republic and the compound republic:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Note that the fundamental definition of republic is, like above, about power deriving from the people. Second, note, that both the single republic, what we would call unitary government with a strong central government sans policy autonomy in the sub-units , and the compound republic, which gives policy powers to the sub-units, are both republics. In short, the essential element of a republic, for Madison (and for contemporary democratic theory as well) is that the power to govern arises from the citizens, not from the specific institutional makeup of the state. Further, and this is key to why I wanted to write this in the first place: it has nothing to do with federalism. Republican government can exist in both federal and non-federal states.
Basic Conclusion. My fundamental point is that there is no logical or conceptual reason to, in the US context, separate the notion of the US being a republic from the US being a democracy. It especially doesn’t make sense to create a false dichotomy between the two.
While it is true that we do not govern solely via majority rule, there is nothing in the definition of democracy that dictates utter majority rule. Indeed, functional democracy requires protection of minority rights, else one can’t actually have democratic governance.
One thing is for sure: it has nothing to do with whether a given country has a federal structure or not and certainly has zero to do with arguments about state power in the US context.
Sphere: Related Content- And, of course, one must acknowledge that not all the inhabitants of the 13 states were fully citizens. So while for the 1780s there was a great deal of shared sovereignty, in contemporary terms, it was tainted by slavery as well as lack of rights for women and the unpropertied. Still, the notion Madison offers here is still one that transcended the dominant understanding of the sources of sovereign power at that time around the world. [↩]
March 13th, 2009 at 12:06 pm
All good clarifications, to be sure.
But, when you say, “functional democracy requires protection of minority rights, else one can’t actually have democratic governance,” I can’t disagree, in principle. However, “minority rights” should not be conflated with super-majority rules.
The former are indeed essential to any idea of “liberal democracy” (which I take to be the same as “republic” in the sense you are using the term), but super-majority requirements for all but the most fundamental guarantees vitiate popular sovereignty and hence are counter-democratic.
(Best statements in recent political science on this from a nice mix of political theory and empirical comparative politics is the work of Tony McGann.)
March 13th, 2009 at 12:19 pm
I concur, on balance. I can see circumstances in some cases wherein supermajority rules might be a good idea in terms of attempting to accommodate highly fragmented societies (a la Lijphart’s work on consociational democracy). Of course, often such rules are simply a means by which to empower a minority’s power position at the expense of a more just and democratic outcome.
I am unfamiliar with McGann’s work, but will give it a looksee.
March 13th, 2009 at 12:24 pm
[...] a follow-up to my post “A Democracy or a Republic” (Part I and Part II), let me return to the fundamental issue at stake, and respond to a comment at OTB (on a post [...]