When Sarah Palin was first announced as John McCain’s running mate, I was asked (as part of the National Journal’s poll of bloggers in association with the conventions) the following:
1. How much do you think Gov. Sarah Palin will help or hurt John McCain?
Help a little
Hurt a little
Hurt a lot
No impact
I answered, and made public on the blog, “Hurt a little” (and took, and have continued to take, some flak from commenters on this assessment). My estimation was based on the following:
On balance, as I noted yesterday, I think that the experience issue is one of McCain’s best lines of attack, and it is now blunted (and I am not alone in my belief that this pick wasn’t the best option for McCain. For example: here).
I do think she helps with the base, but if one has to excite one’s base at this late date, then one has a problem. Indeed, based on reading initial reactions to the pick, Palin excites the base more than McCain ever did or ever will. Of course, the fact that at the moment she is essentially a blank slate helps on that score (i.e., she can be whatever people want her to be).
So take the positive of exciting the base with the loss of the experience argument and include also the fact that we really don’t know how well she will perform on the national stage and you get hurts a little to potentially hurting a lot.
The question was asked on the afternoon of Friday, August 29 (the day Palin was named) and my above-response was written on Sunday, August 31. The main thesis that informed my view was that political rookies rarely (if ever) do well on the national stage and that they contain a higher probability of causing problems that they do of creating positive outcomes for a ticket. It should also be noted that to my mind, the question encompassed not just the convention timeframe, but the entirety of the general election campaign, and so the overall assessment of whether I was right or wrong remains to be seen. The long-term implications of me being wrong will be dealt with below (not because of me, but broader political implications). First, however, let’s look at the short-term and my initial reaction.
Short-Term. First off, I will readily admit that she did far better at the convention than I expected. While I did not (to my recollection) make any particular predictions about the speech, there is no doubt that had I been asked before the speech that I would have never predicted she would be as composed or as politically compelling as she turned out to be. While I clearly thought (as noted above, and as initially noted here) that she would excite the base, I was not expecting as much excitement as she clearly generated. I do, however, stand by the assertion that she “excites the base more than McCain ever did or will” and I continue to think that that indicates inherent weakness in the ticket that will reveal itself over time.
One thing I was utterly wrong about, and that was that Palin clearly helped, and more than a little, in the short term. McCain’s campaign rather brilliantly managed to capture the post-DNC news cycle, and really has not yet surrendered it. What looked like a possible disaster of an RNC (with Gustav looming) turned into a net positive for the GOP. Further, the confluence of Palin, Gustav and the fact that the RNC was the next week after the DNC led to coverage and discussion of the DNC and Obama’s speech basically ending Thursday the 28th of August. This worked to McCain’s advantage rather substantially, as the Gallup tracking poll would indicate, amongst others. 1
I maintain that the very controlled nature of Palin’s public exposure is an indication that the McCain campaign understands and agrees with my basic assessment: rookies can do a lot of harm. They are trying, and perhaps successfully, to capitalize on the excitement and the Rorschach nature of Palin’s candidacy while limiting overall exposure, and therefore diminishing the probability of a problem. If they can do that and win, then the Palin Stratagem and commensurate Palin Effect will, I think, have some long-term significance to US presidential politics.
Long-Term. Clearly, I would prefer to be right in my political analyses and prognostications: really, don’t we all? Indeed, the desire to be right is a particular pathology associated with the professoriate (and, my wife often notes , and only half-jokingly, Taylor males). However, it is wholly possible that I am wrong and that Palin will continue to help McCain, and not just a little. Let’s say that McCain wins in November. While it is always exceptionally difficult to tease out a single cause for a win, there is little doubt that the Palin pick will be seen as the pivotal moment in the campaign that propelled McCain to victory. Should that occur there will be no doubt whatsoever that my initial response to Palin (and subsequent criticisms of the selection) will be shown to be incorrect in terms of predicting her influence. However, as monumentally interesting as me being wrong undoubtedly is (because, you know, it is so rare and everything…), the really interesting implication for a McCain win with Palin Power is that it will shake up future running mate selections.
Currently it is assumed that there are three basic (and somewhat overlapping) strategies for picking a veep: 2
1) Electoral Advantage: the ability of the running mate to deliver/help deliver a home state or perhaps a region (e.g., LBJ in 1960).
2) Governing: the ability of the selection to aid in governance once elected, but not to really help electorally (e.g., Gore in 1992, Cheney in 2000).
3) Addressing a Weakness: the ability of a running mate to help address a perceived weakness at the top of the ticket, usually in terms of policy or ability (e.g., Biden in 2008).
As noted, there are not mutually exclusive, but they do represent distinct major rationales. Biden, for example, clearly was selected primarily for reason 3, but also fits into reason 2. He really doesn’t help in terms of 1, as Delaware, or even New England in general isn’t really on the table. Yes, they are playing the whole “scrappy kid from Scranton (PA)” bit, but that represent trying to squeeze everything they can out of the candidacy, not the main reason, by a long shot, for putting him on the ticket.
Palin’s selection fits 1 and 3, but not in traditional ways. Palin is clearly selected to increase electoral appeal, but not in terms of a specific state/region (while there were some who thought that Alaska might be in play, this always seemed a long shot, and after all, we are talking about three electoral votes). Palin was selected to address some of McCain’s weaknesses, but not in terms of policy, but more for ideology, and there were some demographic considerations as well. Clearly she was not selected for reason number 2.3
To date, the Palin Effect has been to excite the base and bring a great deal of attention to the McCain ticket. It has done so not by specifically targeting a state or region (although clearly the campaign is hoping she resonates in the West, South and in small towns in general) or even a specific policy weakness. It instead has to do primarily with ideology (with a heapin’ helpin’ of personality as well).
In short: if McCain wins, I think that we will see a reassessment of the veep-selection process in future campaigns, with a fourth category being added to the above:
4) Ideological Excitation/Augmentation: Picking a running mate specifically to augment the ideological bona fides of the ticket and to excite the party base.
Of course, the fact that McCain doesn’t excite the base of his party may make all of this somewhat sui generis (i.e., one expects that the top of ticket usually doesn’t need help in this area), but one clear truth about electoral politics is that whatever something is perceived to have worked in the past, it will be replicated in the future.4 One can certainly see a future wherein a candidate who is lagging in the summer polls reaches out for a running mate who doesn’t really fit 1-3 above, but instead fits 4. If the stratagem of picking a base-exciting, but otherwise not useful electorally or in terms of governance running mate works, it will be replicated in the future. If, however, the excitement fades to the point that McCain loses handily, or especially if Palin ultimately only excites the base and not enough independents, then future attempts at the Palin Stratagem are far less likely.
A fundamental issue here is whether Palin ends up creating (and sustaining) a widespread effect, which seems to be the case at the moment, as that is very different than the traditional electoral strategizing inherent in number 1 above.
A subplot, if you will, of the Palin Stratagem, is the degree to which the picking being not only ideologically interesting, but relatively unknown, comes into play. Is the best way to generate a Palin Effect to have someone who appears a certain way to the target audience, but that otherwise is difficult to test (i.e., by an extensive record, or by extensive media exposure)? Is the ideological excitement enough, in other words, or does leaving the selection as broadly open for interpretation as possible part of the appeal?
Conclusion. In short, much of this is speculative, as it is wholly unclear if the Palin Stratagem will pay off and therefore leads to a discernible Palin Effect that future campaign would want to emulate. We just don’t know how all of this will play out. Mostly I am staking a claim that if McCain wins, the political perception (and perhaps the political reality) will be that the unorthodox selection of Palin was the underlying reason for the win. Even if McCain loses a close one, Palin’s ideological profile will be seen as taking McCain from moribund candidate to almost winning, and that will be more than enough to motivate future candidates to consider that strategy in the future.5
At a minimum, Palin is a different kind of veep selection, not just because of the base/ideological angle but because of her almost unknown status. While one can conjure examples of relative unknowns being picked (e.g, Quayle, although he, at least, had twelve years in Congress), it is hard to think (by that I mean, I cannot think of one) of a recent selection, winners or losers, who were consciously selected for ideology and base excitement alone and, by extension, where record was not part of the appeal. As such, the success or failure of the selection will have a long-term effect on running mate selection going forward, especially for presidential candidates who are in second at the time of the veep selection.
No doubt there is much more to be discussed here, and no doubt my initial analysis will require further refinement, but I do think that how this all plays out will influence the way that running mates on major party tickets will be selected in the future. Palin is clearly a deviation from established patterns, and is certainly a deviate from recent winners, as both Clinton and Bush made selections very much based on governing and not about electoral strategies.
Beyond the election, the Palin selection (should McCain win) will also likely result in a deviation from the recent pattern of Presidents actively utilizing their veeps, as was the case with both Clinton and Bush. Palin would likely be used in a more traditional role of symbolic actions and doing the “standby equipment” routine. Of course, that may well turn out not to be the case, but apart from energy (really, oil) I am not sure what policy expertise, or even interest, she brings to the table.6
Addendum. One thing that watching all of this has reminded me: US presidential elections always boil down to a binary choice that results in the hardening of positions between those who are 1’s and those who are 0’s (as the discussion here illustrates). A lot of this is simply endemic to electoral democracy: at some point one has to mentally and emotionally commit to a party or candidate if one is going to vote for said candidate. Still, the recent cycle has fueled my growing personal disquietude about our electoral system, in that I would radically prefer a system that allowed a better reflection of the various currents of political within the US population, i.e., one that encouraged more competitive parties. 7 The current system forces us into a two-candidate contest, as the viability of a third contender is practically zero, even if it is theoretically a possibility. Indeed, the authors of the Electoral College expected multi-candidate elections (hence the theoretical part), but they were wrong (the practice part). In reality the structural forces of our system lead to the inevitable two-candidate contest and to the necessity of supporters to see all the good about their side and all the bad about the other. More choices would not necessarily ameliorate the basic dynamic, i.e., we would still end up rooting for our “team” but it would be more healthy for our democracy if we had more teams to choose from.
Of course, all of this is academic, as the likelihood of electoral reform, such as doing away with the Electoral College and going to, say, a popular vote with a run-off provision, is about as likely to happen anytime soon as I am to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Still, one can dream.8
(Parting Note: what are the odds that this post will generate anywhere near the response than did the lipstick on a pig discussion? I am sure that it won’t. Partially because it is lengthy and people tend not to read the longer posts (indeed a member of my family one informed to me that they tended not to read the longer ones) and partially because it is more “academic-y”. Mostly, however, I think it will be because people like to comment when a post has some an element the Us v. Them dynamic. Also, this one probably won’t show us the Sphere content box as CNN, meaning less incoming traffic to it in particular. Still, we shall see (of course, by making this comment, I am probably influencing the experiment).)
Sphere: Related Content- The next big test that will determine if short-term victory really means a serious shift in the election’s dynamic, will be the first debate. [↩]
- There are other possible rationales, but I think that these three are the main categories. [↩]
- That is not a slam, by the way, but a rather obvious fact. If one takes it as a slam or dig at Palin, one perhaps ought to consider how one’s partisan lens may be coming into play in terms of evaluating the point. [↩]
- Much like the way networks respond to TV shows on other networks, if not their own. [↩]
- If that scenario plays out, by the way, then one can fairly state that I was wrong in my initial assessment, as it will mean that Palin “helped a little” it not “a lot”. [↩]
- In truth, I am not convinced that being governor of a oil state equals actual expertise in the policy arena in question. As I have noted before, if one lives on top of a pool of black gold, where is it that one has had to develop much of an expertise on the problems of oil supply shortages? Still, that wouldn’t stop a McCain administration from making her an Energy Czar, which would likely mean simply a pro-drilling booster. [↩]
- Some students may note a change in my views on this subject, as while I never rejected, in theory, the notion that more choices is better, I used to be more inclined to be content with the way the system reflected the dominant political climate in the country. Over the last several years I have been increasingly unhappy with the evolution of the party system. My general reticence in the past was also driven by the belief (which persists) that serious structural reform is radically unlikely, so therefore one ought to simply deal with the system one has. I have simply decided, more than anything else, to allow myself to indulge in some idealism on this subject, and to even be willing to argue for reform, regardless of the probabilities involved. I will confess as to not having reached full conclusions on what my dream reforms would be. [↩]
- See the previous note. [↩]
September 13th, 2008 at 3:12 pm
You have some really great insights on this matter, and I think your ability to re-consider your initial reaction to the Palin choice is admirable.
I’ve had some serious thought and reflection on the matter as well. My thoughts about Sarah Palin and her impact on our system of governance have changed several times since she was announced, partly becauase of the research I’ve done on her, and partly because of some of the things you’ve mentioned in this post (which I came to on my own, and it’s a bit reassuring to know that other folks have come to similar conclusions).
It is disconcerting to think that we are now choosing VP’s primarily because of their impact on the electorate. And while I like Sarah Palin (still) after research that has become quite exhaustive, I’m afraid there are an awful lot of folks who like her more than I do and haven’t done half the work I have.
If you are correct in your hypothesis (that there is now consideration #4 in choosing a VP) - one thing that I wonder is, was it an accident or was it planned this way?
I’ve gone back and forth on this. The evidence is anecdotal, I think, and you can make a case either way. You and I disagreed pretty loudly about this a few weeks ago. I’ve since vascillated on the issue and where I am now is a few degrees off of where I was then.
I think a lot of what has happened was planned because it fits the facts, but I have to add a caveat to that: while I think she might - might - have been selected last-minute, I’m pretty sure that she was on the radar as a serious contender for a long time.
I think that probably the McCain campaign anticipated being behind in the polls late in the game. What serious analyst wouldn’t? Following the Bush administration, what serious analyst wouldn’t have said that McCain would lag late in the game, even with the republican base (who have been wishy-washy about Bush in the last couple of years, if not downright disappointed in him).
It probably wasn’t his first choice to be behind late in the game - but I think he probably came up with possibility #4 a long while ago, and kept it as a fall-back option in case things panned out badly for him going into August. And they did. He was way behind, the base was flat, and something had to be done.
Why he didn’t tell the media about her fits the facts, too. Because really, possibility #4 can be neutralized by the opposition if they have enough time to do so. With 50 or so days in the chute and Palin Fever still running high, it’s entirely possible that it never will be neutralized, and she will, as you said, give McCain a fighting chance and make this election very close.
But, probably, he hoped he wouldn’t have to go the Palin route, because probably he hoped he’d be in a better position in August than he was. That said, I don’t think he believed he would be, and probably had Palin in the chute for just such an emergency.
I’m just saying that there is no way a serious analyst could have looked at things a few months ago and told McCain “you’re going to be ahead of Obama in August.” We all knew that. Everyone knew that.
I think Palin was sort of a “nuclear option”. I don’t think she was a crapshoot in the traditional sense of the word - I think McCain had a pretty clear understanding of what she would do and the impact she would have, and he probably chose her because it was in his best interest to do so. Because let’s face it - if he didn’t do something radical in August, he was doomed. Romney? Pawlenty? These guys aren’t radical. They would not have done what Palin has.
Long term, I think you’re right. It’s not a good sign - not so much because of the person, but because of the underlying processes that yielded her. I think you and I probably would disagree about her particular qualifications and fitness for the vice presidency, but I don’t think that’s what we’re really talking about - I think we’re really talking about what impact she is going to have on the way VP’s are selected.
I think you’re right. Even if all she does is make it close, but McCain loses, we will have a new model for picking VP’s, especially when we’re down in the polls.
And again, I hate, hate, hate polls. Take the polls out of the picture, and you don’t have VP’s being picked based on the candidate’s current polling. I again think that polling is driving politics too hard. It’s too much a part of the equation.
Anyway - if your hypothesis is true, I don’t think it was accidental. I think McCain is a good strategist and tactical thinker. One thing about small unit leaders (which you could say he was) in the military - especially if you have combat experience - you learn to never do anything without a “go-to-heck” plan. Always have that plan, however desperate, of how to bail yourself out if things are really going bad.
For the record - I think it’s possible that someone could be picked because of #4, and still end up being able to do #1, #2, and #3. My personal opinion of Palin is that her governing ability has been underestimated almost as much as was her impact on the electoral scene. Of course, that is just what my digging and my spidey-sense tells me, and I could be wrong. But I don’t think #4 excludes one from being fit to govern; as you said, these things are not mutually exclusive.
Even so - it is hard to think that it is a good thing for us to be picking our VP’s almost exclusively on the basis of helping us win the election. I’m pretty sure that’s what both guys did. Obama just overestimated the value of Biden to his ticket.
September 13th, 2008 at 3:20 pm
Oh, and for the record -
I’m with you on the electoral system. I said it in a previous post - it’s a shame that there aren’t more viable options for us to choose from.
Every time I go to the polls, I feel like I’m a triangle, and that there are two holes: one is a circle, the other a square, and I have a civic duty to force myself through one of them.
I generally vote republican because I can fit myself through that hole, most of the time, without having to saw off one of my arms. But it’s far from a comfortable fit.
September 13th, 2008 at 5:02 pm
I’d differ a little with your categories and assignments:
Gore a governing pick? I’d say there was already a 4th category. Gore was a reinforcing pick. Clinton used Gore to reinforce the idea that “We’re young, We’re Southern, We’re not the Mondale/Dukakis Democrats you’re used to”. Gore didn’t give an electoral advantage, he didn’t cover a weakness, and I don’t recall anything from ‘92 about what he was going to be doing as VP(the whole reinventing government gig came much later).
I also think you’ve missed one of the real points of the Palin pick. Many analysts jumped on the that Palin was bad because it lost the experience argument against Obama. Instead the pick has highlighted the experience piece — “Our #2 has more experience than their #1″. Indeed, Obama’s entire outfit fell into the trap of making the Obama/Palin comparisons. Each time someone went on a 750 word tirade of why Obama is more experienced it cemented the idea that they’re about the same. It would be interesting how frequently Obama’s experience was mentioned in the week pre/post Palin.
September 13th, 2008 at 5:20 pm
Hi Stephen,
I’m an outlier, I tend to only read the longer posts. Good analysis.
Regards, C
September 13th, 2008 at 5:42 pm
“Our #2 has more experience than their #1″.
I don’t think that that is an empirically supportable statement.
More to the point, however, what appears to have happened is that the GOP line is simply that experience is no longer the issue. McCain is running on a combo of “change” and standard GOP talking points, including “the media is out to get us.”
And back to the VP categories, surely picking someone to re-inforce one’s own policies is a “I’m picking him to help me govern” choice. Gore was already known as an environmental policy wonk at the time (remember Earth in the Balance?).
The reinventing government bit was actually from the DLC and was popularized by a books written by David Osborne, who wrote “Laboratories of Democracy” which featured various policy innovations at the state level, with Bill Clinton being one of the featured governors and then he went on to co-author “Reinventing Government”–which came out just as the Clinton administration was starting (in 1993, I think).
Gore was not perceived at the time to serve a specific electoral strategy, nor was, I would argue, Cheney. Both were considered, from the beginning, men who would be assets to the president once in office.
September 13th, 2008 at 5:52 pm
Put another way: if the goal of a pick is to simply reinforce the top of the ticket, that seems to me be a “governing pick” (i.e., reinforcing that the top of ticket doesn’t need anything added to him and that the second line is simply a reflection of the top, hence reinforcing how one will govern).
September 13th, 2008 at 6:20 pm
This is where people can argue until they’re blue in the face.
Me, I would argue that even if it’s a common PERCEPTION that the republican #2 has more/better experience than the democrat #1, it is a huge problem for the democrats. Doesn’t matter if it’s a false perception. Just being there is a 600 pound gorilla in the room.
Whether it’s empirically supported or not is contestable. It sort of comes down to what you think of as valid experience, how much weight you give to this or that. People are going to differ on that.
But I sort of get what post #3 was driving at. Whether you can go into the Temple of Empirical Evidence with it or not, the democratic ticket has a problem. So far they haven’t handled it well, and every attempt to assault it has yielded another percentage point for the McCain ticket in those dastardly polls.
I don’t understand why they are using Obama to attack Palin on experience, when you can’t empirically say one way or the other who has more or whose is more valid. They have plenty of surrogates - Biden, Hillary, Bill, Ted Kennedy - who have TONS of that almighty experience. These are the people who the democratic ticket should be sending after Palin. When Obama does it he looks silly, sounds silly, and comes across as petty - and McCain goes up a point. It doesn’t play to his strengths but highlights his weaknesses. It’s bad campaigning, plain and simple.
One thing’s for sure. This election got interesting really fast. It’s interesting not only in that it’s closer (which, by the way, I called a long time ago) and probably will stay that way, barring some huge gaff by Palin or McCain; but also in the long-term ramifications, not just if McCain wins, but if he loses and it’s close.
Either will change the way some things are done. We’re probably going to come out of this election with different VP selection strategies; modifications to the democrats’ primary process; and, if Palin turns out to be the real deal (which, I argue, is still a possibility; someone with little experience can still turn out to be a stellar performer - everyone has to start somewhere) a possible serious re-alignment of a large number of female voters to the republican party.
If she’s wimpy and a poor leader, this won’t happen. But - as you’ve pointed out - we don’t know. And if we don’t know about what she’ll do, she could turn out to be an extremely skillful statesperson; that is a possible outcome, even if we don’t know yet. If she does turn into that - zounds, it’s going to make a lot of noise. Because if she’s the real deal, she won’t be going away; at the end of McCain’s term, she will still be in the national arena.
What was an extraordinarily boring race got interesting in the span of a few days.
September 13th, 2008 at 6:39 pm
I haven’t consumed the whole thing yet, but I’m driven to comment on your suggestion that a Senator from Delaware would have any influence on New England. Methinks you’ve spent too much time in the South, Doc.
They may all be damn Yankees, but there’s more than a few flavors of damn Yankees.
September 13th, 2008 at 6:54 pm
Cap’n D:
I will allow that it depends on how one operationalizes “experience.”
And yes, Palin may yet be extraordinary. However, my main problem is that the only way we can find out is in the midst of a crisis. Her selection tells me far more about McCain than it does Palin.
September 13th, 2008 at 6:57 pm
Boyd:
Fair enough.
I was thinking in terms of states in the region that he could influence beyond Delaware, and I don’t think that there are any. But yes, fair enough, I am showing my Southern/Southwestern/Western bias as I think of Delaware as part of New England, but I see in consulting Google that that is an incorrect assignation.
September 13th, 2008 at 7:42 pm
In response to finding out how one handles a crisis:
Let me put my thinking in a different light. I don’t elevate experience the way that other people do. By itself it means nothing. When I was in my early 20’s, I was put in charge of a platoon of soldiers in combat, with zero experience as a leader. Some of my peers, who had months or even a year or more of experience in the same job handled crises worse than I did. If experience is the judge and jury, I should have been unsuccessful, and yet I did very well.
How about as a professor - do you ever think that some of your students walk away from the same class with a better grasp of the material than others? Is it all about hard work, or is there room for inate ability to come into play? We’re making a lot out of experience and forgetting that some the worst leaders in our history had TONS of it. I can think of a list of generals as long as my arm who were horrific leaders, who made absolutely bizarre and unthinkable decisions, who had more military experience than ten of me.
Plain truth is, leadership is largely an intangible, un-empirical thing. You can’t measure it. You can’t learn it if you don’t have it. If you do have it, you can learn tools to make you better and more effective, but you’re either a leader or you’re not. Bam. That’s it.
But even then - it’s fair to ask, where is the leader going to lead us?
Ideology comes into play here, and I think that’s part of what you’re seeing with people jumping about the S.S. Palin.
If it’s me voting - I’ll take my chances with someone who is untested in a crisis rather than cast a vote for someone that has told me how they will handle a crisis, and it is a way that is unacceptable to me. I’ll take my chances with an unknown who promises something that sounds good over someone who has promised to do things that I think are bad, and shown me that they mean it by their past actions.
Put another way - I’d vote against an experienced leader if I thought the individual would use that leadership to take the country in a direction I don’t think it should go. I’d rather vote for an unknown. At least that way I have a chance at a positive outcome.
As far as Delaware goes:
Delaware has an interesting demographic. The locals there who live in the northern part of the state often refer to the southern part of the state (which is surprisingly rural in nature) as “Slower Lower” Delaware.
Not at all a homogenous state.
September 13th, 2008 at 7:42 pm
Absolutely right! But that’s what makes it such an interesting dynamic.
Back during the immigration reform debates the opponents hit the right strategy to defeat it. By using the word “amnesty” that term became the subject of debate. Everytime McCain or Bush (or other reform supporter) when into contortions to explain why the reform wasn’t amnesty they lost ground in the debate. One side says “AMNESTY!” and the other goes into a professorial explaination on touchbacks, waiting time, financial penalties, etc. The debate was lost on that word.
The same thing is happening here — the visceral overcomes the quantatative. Obama’s experience may well indeed be greater than Palin’s, but Obama loses the debate each and every time the comparison is made because it points out his lack of experience. The subject isn’t a comparison of how many months on various jobs of Obama vs. Palin; the comparison becomes the much closer to home — is Obama experienced? He loses that debate every time.
September 13th, 2008 at 7:59 pm
Experience is not the issue? That’s the main thrust of nearly everything McCain is putting out. All of the celebrity comparisons, anything that makes Obama look like an out of touch elitist, the snarky “the One” comments about Obama — They’re all about experience. Troll over to the McCain campaign site and look at the various commercials they have in some way make fun of Obama for being inexperienced in governing. Comparing him to Moses doesn’t work if he’s experienced, nor does making fun of the whole “community organizer” title.
September 13th, 2008 at 8:04 pm
Experience is not the issue? That’s the main thrust of nearly everything McCain is putting out. All of the celebrity comparisons, anything that makes Obama look like an out of touch elitist, the snarky “the One” comments about Obama — They’re all about experience.
Yes, but that was pre-Palin. The whole “celebrity” attack was before McCain decided that it was the way to go. Same with the Moses ad and everything else.
(Indeed, McCain rallies are heavily relying on Palin’s celebrity for turn-out, which I find amusing/ironic.)
I could be wrong, but are there any post-RNC ads that are highlighting experience? Is he dinging Obama over experience on the stump with Palin standing next to him? I don’t think so, but I may be wrong. It seems like now he is talking about reform/change.
September 13th, 2008 at 8:18 pm
Oh, one more thought. It’s a boring war story but hear me out here.
When I took over the scout platoon of an airborne battalion (a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away), I had to pick an RTO (radio telephone operator), as you always do when you take over a combat unit at the company level and below.
I had not been in the job for 24 hours when I made my selection. It was a 19-year-old guy from Wisconsin. I met him my first day on the job when my platoon sergeant told me we had to go to an article 15 hearing about him.
He had been in town that weekend, got drunk, and punched an off-duty cop. The command talked the civil authorities into releasing him into our custody for punishment.
The commander wanted to fry him. I took a look around; morale in the unit was so low it could fit under a snake. I talked to him. He was smart - really smart. His behavior was a reflection of conditions in the unit. So I went to bat for him; he got administrative punishment, was busted down a pay grade and became my RTO, which is one of the most important jobs in the platoon. He prepped my maps. He answered the radio for me when I was too busy to do it myself. He kept me in contact with my command. I trusted him with my life.
Everyone thought I was crazy. They thought I was stupid. They thought my judgement was poor. They thought all of these things because of who I picked for my RTO.
We went to the ‘Stan together, and I remember him talking on the radio about our situation, clearly and calmly, while a hunk of metal shrapnel from a destroyed truck stuck out of his neck. He was bleeding profusely. Mid-sentence he paused, shot at a guy, and went back to business as if nothing had happened. And had I not seen the wound - which was life-threatening - I would never have known he was hit. He talked on the radio, feeding mortar plots to my commander while sticking himself in the arm to start an IV.
Shortly after I left the unit, he went on to OCS, finished college, and ultimately became an infantry and then special forces officer. He has successfully commanded troops in the ‘Stan, in Iraq - multiple tours. He’s got a chest full of medals. He’s got a bright future as a military commander.
I’ve had people who told me I was an idiot for giving that kid such great responsibility call me just to apologize. In fact, somewhere I have a letter from my company commander expressing his admiration for my ability to see in that guy something that he couldn’t see himself. He apologized for questioning my judgement.
I have a couple of morals to my story.
The first is that empircal evidence alone is insufficient to judge a person’s potential. So questioning McCain’s judgement because he picked what to us is an unknown (Sarah Palin) to me, while not unacceptable, does assume that we know better than John McCain. Maybe we don’t. I’m not saying that for sure - but it’s possible. Maybe he’s seen a dimension of this person that we haven’t. And, perhaps, he’s just plain better and smarter about such things than we are. I’m not saying this is true. But we have to concede - there is always someone smarter than me.
The second is that experience isn’t everything. Leadership - especially in a crisis - is as much about who you are as it is what you know. I’ve seen people with a lot of training and experience panic at the first shot; and I’ve seeen my RTO, with only basic training and airborne school under his belt, stick himself with an IV bag so he could stay conscious long enough to finish our mission.
How do you know who will do what? I’ve seldom been able to figure this out empirically. I’ve trusted my instincts and they’ve been right more often than they’ve been wrong.
If Palin does turn out to be the real deal - is McCain’s judgement still in question, or should we question our own?
September 13th, 2008 at 8:55 pm
Cap,
By “empirical” at the moment I simply mean the only things we have to go on: resume and biography. What else can we judge a candidate by? Sure, maybe McCain’s gut is right about Palin, but it is really fair to the country for us to only find out if his judgment is correct once there is a crisis?
I fully understand that experience or resume is not enough and that some folks with do in a job. Sometimes the best person for a job is the one with the least paper qualifications. The problem is, some jobs are too important to test the thesis.
September 13th, 2008 at 9:15 pm
I guess my point was just this:
If McCain wins the election, AND Palin turns out to be a great leader (both of which are huge IF’s, I understand) how will history paint his judgment in selecting her? History may yet vindicate John McCain on what at the time was a controversial decision.
And, it may prove him a fool.
The trouble with history - it only tells us these things in hindsight.
September 13th, 2008 at 9:32 pm
Hi!
Interesting article. It seems early to make a historical analysis of something that happened about two weeks ago, but it is an interesting thing to consider what lessons people might take away from this most unexpected move by the McCain campaign.
I disagree with this claim in your article: “While one can conjure examples of relative unknowns being picked (e.g, Quayle, although he, at least, had twelve years in Congress), it is hard to think (by that I mean, I cannot think of one) of a recent selection, winners or losers, who were consciously selected for ideology and base excitement alone and, by extension, where record was not part of the appeal.”
I believe Gov. Palin’s record was a part of her appeal to McCain, and remains a part of her appeal as a candidate. Specifically, that part of it which began in 2002 when she assumed leadership of Alaska’s regulatory commission for the oil industry. However little known outside her home state, this is the record of a reformer, and it is being touted by the McCain campaign.
September 13th, 2008 at 11:42 pm
If McCain wins the election, AND Palin turns out to be a great leader (both of which are huge IF’s, I understand) how will history paint his judgment in selecting her? History may yet vindicate John McCain on what at the time was a controversial decision.
And, it may prove him a fool.
There is no doubt about any of that. The question becomes, based on what we know, which is the more likely outcome?
September 14th, 2008 at 1:27 am
“4) Ideological Excitation/Augmentation: Picking a running mate specifically to augment the ideological bona fides of the ticket and to excite the party base.”
This isn’t exactly sui generis; I think you can explain Bush-Quayle this way in 1988, and possibly Carter-Mondale in 1976 too, although there was some sectionalism involved there as well. Certainly a southern, avowedly evangelical governor as nominee (on paper at least, given that Carter governed more to the left than you’d have expected from his record in Georgia) was well to the right of the post-68 Democratic Party median.
In general I think a return to a less active vice-presidency would be a good thing. I doubt Ford, for example, could have governed after Nixon’s resignation if he’d been involved in day-to-day administration business. Even going back to Gore, whose job mostly involved smashing ashtrays with hammers and debating Ross Perot on Larry King (perhaps because the meaty job, health care, was being done by HRC), would be a win. Rather than concentrating on policy per se (where Biden and Palin will simply parrot their masters’ talking points), that might be the most useful type of question to get at in the veep debate.
September 14th, 2008 at 8:59 am
Chris,
“Sui generis” is a problematic term to sling about, I will allow, but I do think that there is something specifically unique about this pick, insofar as whatever energy McCain has at the moment appears to be linked to excitement over the vice presidential pick.
Without getting into any other issue for the moment, Mondale did not excite the base of the Democratic Party more than did Carter nor did Quayle, while liked by the social conservatives in the GOP hardly was the engine that generated the Bush victory.
Plus, I am talking here about strategic choices made by candidates, whether right or wrong. To wit: since LBJ at least, candidates have sought out the mythical running mate who can “deliver a state” but it is questionable as to how easy that actually is to do (ask Edwards, for example).
If McCain wins, or come close, there will be second place in the polls candidates who be more prone to look for ideological (or whatever you want to call it) spark. Or, at least, so I think.
And BTW, just because a VP is selected for the “governing” reason doesn’t mean that they will do anything meaningful in office.
Even the Mondale pick, which was a lot geography had some of the governing logic attached to it, since Carter needed someone with Washington/legislative experience on the ticket.
Of course, it is possible that “ideology” or “base excitement” is simply a subset of #3 (addressing a weakness). Still, this just strikes me as an interesting pick from the standpoint of the type of weakness being addressed and the manifestation thereof–which is the diversion of attention away from the top of the ticket.
September 14th, 2008 at 9:11 am
Beyond the classifications, let me put it this way: do we know of a case where a candidate rode the popularity of his vice presidential pick to the White House?
BTW: I am far from convinced that this will happen, but if it does, that will be the lesson that a lot of politicians will take from the election and we will see attempts at replicating the feat.
September 14th, 2008 at 12:15 pm
Indeed.
Whether we are in agreement about the ultimate suitability of the choice McCain made (history will tell) or not, there is no doubt that the pick itself will influence future electoral strategy. I think this will happen whether or not McCain wins, as long as the election is close. Even if Palin turns out to be a good deal, it’s a bad deal for us in the long run because it has changed the VP selection process in a way that makes it easier for a less qualified person to fill the role (although it doesn’t mean that less qualified individuals MUST fill the role; just that it will be more possible for that outcome to happen).
I have to say this, though. I think that Palin’s popularity has been as much about failure on the democratic end as anything else; what I’ve seen since the conventions out of the Obama campaign borderlines on implosion. I think that there are far more effective strategies to use in addressing the Palin Effect than what the democratic ticket has done. I’m beginning to see Obama as an acute micromanager; he doesn’t seem able to use his runningmate effectively on the campaign trail, or any of his allies within the party. Everywhere you look it’s Obama, Obama, Obama.
The way to neutralize Palin is to go after her on experience with specific points, using people who have experience in those areas. Send Biden or Bill Clinton to go after her on foreign policy. Send Hillary for domestic policy and send Ted Kennedy out there to steal some of the sympathy vote.
I’m wondering, if he’s elected, will Obama be able to share the spotlight with someone like a cabinet member? Or is he going to run the white house the way he’s run his campaign - as a one-man show?
September 14th, 2008 at 1:11 pm
Steven, your first reason given for a running-mate selection, electoral advantage, should not be read only as home-state or home-region impact. Even in the LBJ case, it is doubtful that the pick led to the “delivery” of the state (which was at that time still part of the Solid South for the party).
Electoral advantage can be about demographic appeal in swing states, even far outside the home state of the VP candidate. Lieberman was this sort of pick, I would argue, and maybe so was Gore, and perhaps Edwards. I think, without doubt, this was a major reason for both picks this year. Both can be said to represent demographic groups that “should” vote for the party anyway, but were perceived as distant from the current presidential candidate: Working-class Catholics and white evangelicals. And both of these groups are located in significant numbers in more than one swing state, as well as in states that were looking swingy (Montana, ND for the GOP, perhaps PA for Dems) but should not be.
Of course, Biden is also about Foreign Policy Experience (TM), but as you say, the reasons for a VP candidate pick need not be mutually exclusive.
September 14th, 2008 at 2:01 pm
MSS,
I am going to argue a bit with you on Texas. In 1952 and 1956, Texas went with Eisenhower (while the Deep South went with the Dems). Likewise in 1928, Texas went with Hoover, while the Deep South went D. As such, Texas (while otherwise one part Dem at the time) was not as sure a bet in Presidential contests.
It was therefore likely that Texas would got with Nixon in 1960 and LBJ clearly was picked with that in mind. Indeed, sans LBJ on the ticket, is quite likely Nixon would have won Texas (although if that was the only state to flip, he still would have lost the election).
JFK won 1,167,567 (50.52%) and Nixon 1,121,310 (48.52%), and LBJ was extremely popular there at the time.
Back to the post, overall, I am arguing about the types of strategies that candidates pursue in selecting candidates. I really ought to rename #1, as really all of the reasons are to generate an electoral advantage for different reasons, as one presumes that a candidate does not select a running mate to create an electoral disadvantage.
September 14th, 2008 at 2:55 pm
OK, I will stoop messing with Texas (at least for now). It’s probably an N of 1 though, in terms of states “delivered” by the VP candidate (if indeed it was; and I still am not necessarily convinced, just saying that the rest of my argument does not depend on our interpretation of 1960).
September 14th, 2008 at 3:27 pm
We are in agreement that Texas in 1960 is probably an N of 1 in terms of states “delivered” by veeps–so perhaps I am not being clear. I am not suggesting in the above post that the categories explain the actual effect of the running mates selected, but rather the way the selectors of those running mates make their choices, i.e., the perceived value of the candidates. In other words, I am suggesting major strategies that presidential candidates appear to pursue in making these selections.
As such, if McCain wins, or even comes close, I think that future selections, in some cases, will be made along the Palin model just as candidates still try (in vain) to replicate 1960 and LBJ.
September 14th, 2008 at 3:36 pm
Got that. I guess what I mean to be saying is that 1960 is an N of 1 not only in the effect (I don’t know, I am skeptical, despite the 1952 and 1956 elections), but but pretty nearly so in the intent, as well. When I think about other VP candidate selections, I don’t see a lot of real key-swing-state selections in there. But then maybe I am overlooking something (maybe Muskie in 1968 was such a pick?; Nate Silver suggested as much at some point in one of his VP analysis posts).
Simpler MSS summary: There are a lot of picks from relatively safe states, but that does not preclude the pick’s being an electoral-advantage pick, because the VP candidate may work to knit tighter into the coalition certain demographic groups (which may help in states far from the home state).
September 14th, 2008 at 3:38 pm
By the way, I will admit that I am having a hard time imagining any demographic group that was turned on by LBJ!
September 14th, 2008 at 3:47 pm
More to think about, to be sure.
Let me put the whole thing another way: if McCain wins, does that make 2008 an outlier in the literature that states that veep selections basically can only have negative effects, not positive ones (and that is a different question than I am addressing in the post)?
It seems to me that if the PalincitementTM is actually able to drive a McCain victory (again, I still find that unlikely) wouldn’t that make the selection historic for reasons other than her gender?
Granted, one doesn’t want to go all single causality on the whole thing, but surely there would be something different about the election.
Mostly I am trying to understand how it can be that this many weeks after the pick that the news coverage and political tide seem (and that word bears stressing) Palin-centric and that interest in McCain appears (again, stressing that word) driven by attention to his number 2. It is unusual at a minimum, yes?
Apart from the part about Palin actually maybe being president at some point in the near future, the whole thing is rather interesting.
September 14th, 2008 at 3:58 pm
Yeah, I think if McCain wins, and we are able to isolate Palin as THE major reason for that (something that will probably be difficult to prove but easy to theorize on), we’ve definitely changed that rule - a VP pick CAN help and not just hurt, and we will have a case study as proof positive. Yes, this will alter the game.
I have to confess one thing - I don’t really believe in the validity of the historical model “a VP candidate can hurt but not help”. The reason is that I don’t think there is a large enough sample size to make historical analysis valid. We can really only go back to 1940 on this because before that, the presidential nominee didn’t do the picking (party leaders did it), and if you go much further than that, again, you’re looking at a very different electorate (women’s suffrage).
So really we’re talking about 12 presidents and their VP’s. I find that difficult to accept as a valid sample.