Yesterday, the NYT had the following graphic in its story about the NIE on Iran and their nuclear ambitions:
Now, as an example of the radical, glaring differences between the two reports, this strikes me as a very poor set of examples. In the first quote from the 2005 report it states that Iran is “determined to develop a nuclear weapon” and then in the 2007 report it states that the program was halted in 2003. Those two statements are not contradictory–especially in the realm of interpretative (and cya-ish) intel-speak. There is no reason why Iran can’t simultaneously have the goal of developing a nuclear weapon and have closed down their weapons program for the moment–especially since the civilian nuclear program continues.
What’s the big, dramatic contradiction here?
Apparently some, for example Norman “I pray Bush bombs Iran” Podhoretz sees these two statements as a significant contradiction. Of course, Podhoretz, perversely, wants Iran to have a nuclear program, so that there is a compelling reason to attack them.
The second statement in the graphic is about when Iran might be able to build a weapon. In the 2005 states that Iran would not be likely to be in a position to build a weapon until mid-next decade (i.e., roughly 2015). In the 2007 statement it says that they would have the enriched uranium needed to make a weapon by 2015. Again, what’s the big, dramatic contradiction here? Yes, there are issues of the ability to take the uranium and make the weapon itself, but surely the most problematic part of all of this is the acquisition of the enriched uranium.
Let me be clear: I am not arguing that the current NIE’s conclusions about the Iranian nuclear program should be ignored or doubted (like those, like Podhoretz, who are oddly vested in the notion that we need to attack Iran). Rather, I was just struck by the lack of clear contradictions in the example cited by the the NYT.
My view on Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains unchanged: it is my assumption that Iran wants a nuclear weapon and will one day acquire one, as one would expect from any ambitious state with the economic and/or technological wherewithal to produce one. Iran seeks both regional balance with nuclear-powered Israel (not to mention other nearby nuclear powers such as Pakistan and India), as well as protection from a US invasion. As such, the appeal of moving towards nuclear status is obvious.
Beyond the obvious reasons why Iran would want a weapon, I also think that a US attack on Iran would be both disastrous for the US and the region and ultimately inefficacious in terms of deterring Iran from acquiring said weapons. As such, the NIE hasn’t really affected my position, and is only relevant, I think, in that it deflates those who would seek military action against Iran.
More reactions at OTB and, of course, Memeorandum.
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December 4th, 2007 at 10:16 am
I agree. From my (brief) review of the new report, the differences are being wildly overstated for political ends.
While the weaponization program appears to have been halted (per the report), work on a number of necessary weapons programs that are part-and-parcel of a nuclear program — such as enriching uranium and ballistic missiles — proceed.
So their weapons program has halted. Except that they’re enriching uranium, working on ballistic missiles, and can still have a nuclear weapon ready by the same date as the earlier report (or earlier).
And that’s a dramatic difference, how again?
December 4th, 2007 at 10:26 am
True, the two statements you reference are not necessarily contradictory. However, these two statements sound like pretty clear contradictions to me:
“Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons” (2005).
“we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons” (2007).
The difference is in the certainty level of the NIE. In the first they have “high confidence” and in the second they “do not know”. Both, however, refer to “currently” not some point in the future, as your commentary seems to allude to.
I am, however, sure you are correct about the cya part.
December 4th, 2007 at 10:28 am
Those two statements aren’t contradictory, as the second one you cite simple states that we don’t know. It is a stepping back from the 2005 statement, but not an explicit contradiction thereof. And yes, cya-ish for sure.
December 4th, 2007 at 10:49 am
I will concede that contradictory is probably not the right term, as they are not now saying that Iran is not interested in developing a nuclear weapon.
December 4th, 2007 at 1:05 pm
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December 4th, 2007 at 3:05 pm
Podhoretz Digests the NIE, Finds It Doesn’t Agree
Posted by Damozel (photo by Scot Campbell*) | Once again, the trumpetings of the blow-hards from the far right have abruptly ended in a horrid sneering sour note as Norman Podhoretz and other hawks try to work out a way to prove they haven’t in fact b…
December 9th, 2007 at 4:34 pm
[...] I argued the other day, the report isn’t as radical as either side is making it out to be. Sphere: Related Content Filed under: US Politics, Iran || [...]
December 9th, 2007 at 4:34 pm
[...] I argued the other day, the report isn’t as radical as either side is making it out to be. Sphere: Related Content Filed under: US Politics, Iran || [...]