The NYT has a lengthy piece concerning the Clinton campaign and what went wrong: The Long Road to a Clinton Exit.
The piece reinforces the notion that the Clinton campaign’s most significant strategic mistake was the assumption that it would be over in February–that, indeed, she was the inevitable nominee. It also underscores the internal campaign conflicts that existed because of the mixing of 90s Clinton and 00s Clinton.
Another bit of flawed strategic thinking that comes through (and was a problem with the thinking in the media as well) is the focus on “wins” and “losses.” An example would be things like focusing on they “won” Ohio and Texas. In terms of getting the most votes, yes, Clinton won. But given the proportional allocation of delegates meant that results were nowhere near as zero sum as the language of victory and defeat suggests.1 While one has to actually come in first in a number of states to ultimately have the most delegates, one could also come in second a lot and still win the nomination. It was clear some time ago that the Clinton campaign started the process without the appropriate mindset, and I am not sure that it ever correctly that point of view. Indeed, part of what led Clinton to announce her lack of a decision on Tuesday was the fact that she had “won” South Dakota. The campaign was marked by an ongoing cognitive dissonance: they only saw “win” and “losses” rather than understanding the true significance of coming in first v. coming in second. This was especially true when in some cases where coming in second meant getting the same number of delegates as coming first.2
Some snippets from the piece that I noted:
On internal campaign problems:
As she flew from town halls to rallies on the road, she did little to stop the infighting back home among advisers who nursed grudges from their White House days. The aides grew distracted from battling Senator Barack Obama while they hurled expletives at one another, stormed out of meetings and schemed to get one another fired.
On Bill:
Mr. Clinton vented frustrations and, still not one to use e-mail, much less a BlackBerry, found his famed instincts inadequate in a blogosphere age that amplified every intemperate outburst.
On incorrect strategic assumptions:
The campaign was built on the assumption of overwhelming force. Strategists believed that the first four contests would be decisive and that she would wrap up the nomination by Feb. 5, when more than 20 states were to hold nominating contests.Sphere: Related Content
- In Ohio, for example, Clinton won 75 delegates and Obama 66. As such, they both “won” something. And in the broader context of the process it was not as big a victory for Clinton as the campaign continues to make it out to be. [↩]
- In Texas, for example, Obama ended up with 99 delegates and Clinton with 94 when one includes both the primary portion and the caucus portion. Clinton saw that as a “big state” win and provided a great deal of media attention, but Obama actually was the “winner” in that contest, even though in the Clinton campaign’s mindset he “lost”. [↩]
