Via WaPo: In Mideast Strife, Bush Sees a Step To Peace
“He [Bush] thinks he is playing in a longer-term game than the tacticians,” said the former official, who spoke anonymously so he could discuss his views candidly. “The tacticians would say: ‘Get an immediate cease-fire. Deal first with the humanitarian factors.’ The president would say: ‘You have an opportunity to really grind down Hezbollah. Let’s take it, even if there are other serious consequences that will have to be managed.’ ”Jack Rosen, chairman of the American Jewish Congress, said Bush’s statements reflect an unambiguous view of the situation. “He doesn’t seem to allow his vision to be clouded in any way,” said Rosen, a Democrat who has come to admire Bush’s Middle East policy. “It follows suit. Israel is in the right. Hezbollah is in the wrong. Terrorists have to be eliminated, and he sees Israel fighting the war he would fight against terrorism.”
This all sounds good, at least in the sense that degradation of a terrorist group is certainly a desirable goal. However, the long-term effects of the action have to be taken into consideration. The likelihood is that Hezbollah can replace both the rockets and the fighters lost in the conflict. Real success will be if that is not the case. However, since material is coming from outside from Syria and Iran, the replenishment of rockets is a near certainty. And, the events of the last week will, without any doubt, aid in the radicalization of Shi’ites in southern Lebanon. As such, I remain unconvinced that this action is going to achieve Israel’s long-term goals.
The main way by which Hezbollah is going to be through the political development of Lebanon and the strengthening of the Lebanese state to the point that it can effectively force the disarmament of Hezbollah. This past year’s “Cedar Revolution” (which was hailed as more than it was, although it was significant) was a step in the right direct: the ousting of Syrian military forces from Lebanon and a public celebration of democratic action. Indeed, there has been some pressure on Hezbollah to disarm–given that having a political party existing as an armed entity is hardly consistent with democracy, not to mention the painfully obvious fact that it allows such a group to conduct its own foreign policy.
However, we are talking roughly a year since the retreat of the Syrians from Lebanon–as such, it is hardly a shock that the anemic Lebanese state has been incapable of forcing Hezbollah to disarm in that time.
And here’s the rub: if the pre-invasion Lebanese state was incapable of dealing effectively with Hezbollah, a post-invasion Lebanese state will be powerless against even a degraded Hezbollah. It is also quite likely that at the end of the day, Syrian influence in Lebanon will increased.
Further, the idea that at the end of the day those citizens of Lebanon who are opposed to Hezbollah are going to band together with Israel is radically optimistic, to put it mildly. The death and destruction in Lebanon is going to create resentment and anger towards Israel, not partners for political development. Indeed, if one looks objectively at the situation: half a million persons displaced, hundreds dead, homes destroyed, infrastructure wrecked, and an economy crippled (that relies heavily on tourism, by the way) and it takes a remarkably optimistic person to look at the situation and say that the majority of Lebanese citizens are going to be in a mood to forgive and forget and blame the whole thing on Hezbollah alone. And even if they do, even more optimism is needed to assume that the result of that blame will be elimination of political extremism and the flowering of pro-western democracy in Lebanon.
Even under the most optimistic scenario, I would argue that it is going to take a massive international effort–both in terms of peacekeepers and money for rebuilding, to even get the Lebanese state back to the status quo ante.
Also in WaPo, David Ignatius (To Save a Revolution) states the following:
The challenge for the Bush administration as the Lebanon war explodes into its second week is just that — to keep faith with Siniora and his Cedar Revolution, even as it stands by its close ally Israel. This isn’t simply a question of appearances and public diplomacy. Unless Siniora’s government can be strengthened, there is little hope for achieving the U.S. and Israeli goal of bringing Hezbollah’s guerrillas under lasting control.
More to the point, the Lebanese state needs to be strengthened, and one can only hope that its democratic development is furthered, but it is unclear at this point that this is going to happen. I agree with Ignatius that there is a substantial challenge here for the Bush administration in balancing the security question with Israel and Hezbollah and the strengthening of the Lebanese state. However, I am not optimistic that such a balance is easily obtained, or necessarily the goal at this point. I fear that the focus is going to be heavily tilted toward the immediate security question, and not the overall political picture.
Ultimately, an unstable Lebanon, or one that returns to its civil-warring ways, is not going to be good for Israel, nor the region–or, for that matter, the general US goal of curtailing the grow of terrorist groups.
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July 21st, 2006 at 10:06 am
Being anti-Israel and being anti Hizb’Allah are not mutually exclusive.
This fight is tribal. It’s about prestige, aura, bragging rights, pride and all that pre-state stuff. Hizb’Allah cannot be seen to have saved Hamas or gotten away scott free with defeating the IDF. It’ll be harder to view Hizb’Allah as a rational actor in such situations and it’ll be harder to discount the possibility of Israeli retaliation.
I think Hamas may be dead, You may be right about Lebanon, but I am not sure of it, but the region is more than just Israel. There has been the very public (thanks to Hizb’Allah broadcasting it) cowing of Syria in this fight, with the Syrians refusing to defend their territory. Hizb’Allah’s value as an ally will be diminished even if it survives with a stronger relative position in Lebanon. Bad for Lebanon, but not necessarily for our broader interests in the region. Further, the calculation that the West would always restrain Israel will be gone.
That sort of calculation will give people a necessary moment of pause before staging other attacks. That’s not to say they won’t happen, some people really do want WWIII or the immanentization of the eschaton over there, but the rational actors will be headed for the exits in any such conflict with the Jewish state.
I doubt you will agree, but does that make sense?
July 21st, 2006 at 10:29 am
Your points are well taken. The long term solution to the current crisis is strategic, i.e. removing the external support for Hezbollah and Hamas. However, while Israel’s current actions are destabilizing to the Lebanese government, that government is fundamentally undermined by the same factors that endanger Israel. Syria will never permit Lebanon from reining in Hezbollah, and Iran can provide funding and training far in excess to what the Lebanese government can supply. Also, both actors can exploit the internal Lebanese divisions more easily than the central government can overcome them. So any destabilization brought on by Israeli actions is probably minor relative to the inherent instability created by Syria and Iran. And any increase in their influence is irrelevant. Their influence is not going to be decreased by Israeli inaction. And internally, Israel cannot tolerate the status quo on its northern border.
July 21st, 2006 at 11:00 am
[...] e? but I certainly understand Dr. Taylor’s pessimism. Similarly, he has also posted The Bush Administration and the Middle East Crisis, to which I replied: For the record, [and for what littl [...]
July 21st, 2006 at 5:18 pm
Let’s get one thing straight about Lebanon and its “democratic” development. Lebanon exists as a separate entity to provide a state for the Christians of the Levant (predominantly the Maronites). Its being a Christian enclave and its being a democracy were compatible only so long as Christians were a majority. They have not been for 30+ years, and Lebanon has not been a democracy since the beginning of its civil war in 1975. (Freedom House considered the state “free” up to 1974, but not since–not even in its 2006 report.) The underlying cause of the civil war was the failure of its political institutions to keep up with demographic changes in favor of Muslims. Nothing that has happened in the last several years–Israeli withdrawal, Syrian withdrawal, or arboreal revolutions–has changed that.
The Taif Accords of 1989 established a legislature and cabinet each split 50:50 between Muslims and Christians, but this is still not “democratic” because that formula entrenches parity for a group that has fallen to only 39% of the population (according to the CIA World Factbook). Moreover, the split of seats not only to Christians and Muslims, but also to the confessional groups within each religious community, are all prearranged and not subject to shifts in votes or population.
If Lebanon were to develop in a genuinely democratic direction, the Muslim (mostly Shiite) majority would need to be recognized as such, albeit presumably with safeguards to allow the Chrisian and other minorities to govern their own cultural affairs and probably with a high level of local autonomy.
Of course, no such solution is even remotely possible so long as Hizbullah remains the leading party among the Shiite population. It is not their only party, but it is by far their largest.
July 21st, 2006 at 10:41 pm
Understood–I used the term “democratic development” purposefully, recognizing that it is inaccurate to call the Cedar “Revolution” any kind of advent of democracy.
However, relative to most of the region (Syria, the PA and Egypt for that matter) it at least has the mechanical elements, albeit flawed ones, of democratic governance.
It does seem to me that the removal of Syrian influence within Lebanon in the past year did provide an opening for potential state development that could lead to greater democratization. However, the current situation pretty much has wrecked that, as there isn’t very much incentive in the near-to-medium term for Hezbollah to give up its armed ways and seek a more civil discourse within the state structures of Lebanon.
And yes, the institutional order is of direct issue–you’ll get no argument out of me there.
And you do get the heart of the issue that alludes much of the commentary: the relative size of the Shi’ite population and the relative strength of Hezbollah within that population–which is why I find this argument that somehow the Lebanese will end up blaming Hezbollah for all of this, and that wiil lead to Hezbollah’s end from within to be something of a fantasy.
Yes, I have heard news stories where Lebanese citizens have railed against Hezbollah for starting this, but that is hardly sufficient.